

# Special Bulletin: State Capture


## Key recommendations and findings of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into State Capture Report



**JUDICIAL**



**LEGISLATIVE**



**EXECUTIVE**

This Bulletin is produced by the Parliamentary Research Unit on the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector including Organs of State.

The Bulletin contains a series of papers for each Part of the Six-Part Report. These papers do not provide an analysis or an assessment of the findings or recommendations of the reports but are intended to assist Members work through and engage with the content of the Report.





## Key recommendations and findings: Judicial Commission of Inquiry into State Capture Report

The papers, in table form, extract and contextualise the recommendations made on the findings of the Inquiry. In most cases, detailed context is provided, alleviating the need to read the voluminous Report. All recommendations have been cross referenced with the recommendations contained in Part 6 Volume 4. For the most part, the wording contained in the Report is retained. Detailed referencing, to page and paragraph numbers in the Report, is provided.

The tables identify the relevant investigatory or other body responsible for implementation of each recommendation. In addition, for each recommendation, a proposal is made as to the most appropriate sector (Committees) to conduct oversight and hold the Executive accountable.


### Research Paper: Key Findings and Recommendations – Parliamentary Oversight

This paper, provides a summary in table form, of the key findings and recommendations made on Parliamentary Oversight. Although the main focus in this paper is on the key findings and recommendations contained in Part 6 Volume 2: Parliamentary Oversight consideration is also given to key references to parliamentary oversight contained in other Parts of the Report.

To read the research paper, [click here](#).

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### Research Paper: Key findings and recommendations contained in Part 1

This paper provides a summary, in table form, of the recommendations in response to the findings made in respect of Part 1 for further investigation by **law enforcement agencies**, with a view to possible prosecution. **To read the research paper, [click here](#).**

## South African Airways (SAA)

An investigation was conducted into South African Airways SOC Limited (SAA), its subsidiary, South African Technical SOC Limited (SAAT) as well as South African Express (Pty) Ltd (SA Express).

### According to the Commission's Report:

- There was a **steady decline in the quality and effectiveness of governance** of SAA from 2012 onwards. This poor quality and ineffectiveness developed over the period that Ms Duduzile Myeni was the Chairperson of SAA and her co-Board member, Ms Yakhe Kwinana, was the Chairperson of SAAT. During both their tenures, acts of corruption and fraud took place at SAA and SAAT.
- **Committed managers**, who tried to stand up to the increasingly unreasonable and unlawful demands of these Board members, were slowly but surely **removed from their positions**.
- The **auditors** appointed to SAA for the 2012 to 2016 financial years **failed dismally to detect any of this fraud and corruption**. The internal audit function in SAA was also hopelessly ineffective in identifying or limiting these criminal acts.
- Fraud and corruption took hold in these entities not only because there was a wholesale failure of governance within the companies but also because, when companies are so depleted of those who are responsible and accountable, the **conditions for state capture take hold**.
- **The costs of state capture** do not just lie in the millions of Rands that are lost to the taxpayer. Those costs do not just lie in the broken careers of people who tried to resist its stranglehold. The costs include the emotional trauma experienced when managers at SAA were subjected to unlawful and invasive state security vetting. The costs include the precarious livelihoods of those who subsequently faced joblessness because those entities were driven into the ground. Finally, the costs lie in Cabinet decision-making that was motivated not by what was in the best interests of a state-owned entity but by the personal preferences of a President.
- In terms of SA Express, the transactions involved officials from the **North West Provincial Government**, including the Executive Council of the Province, flouting the procurement framework in awarding SA Express a 5-year contract to provide flights to Mahokeng and Pilanesberg International Airport.
- By 2019, a criminal investigation was underway and High Court litigation had been instituted. However, despite all of these steps, by the time that the Commission heard evidence emanating from this investigation in June 2019, **the criminal process had not gained substantial momentum and the litigation had not advanced matters**.

- The structure of the agreement entered into between SA Express and the Transport Department proved to be an **unprecedented act orchestrated by officials of SA Express to loot funds from the North West Government**.
- Once the funds from the North West Government had been secured by SA Express, it introduced certain service providers to do ground handling services at the airports, without following any procurement processes. Those service providers were then used to **syphon public funds to various connected individuals** and organisations.

### Research Paper: Key findings and recommendations: Part 1 South African Airways

This paper provides a summary, in table form, of the recommendations in response to the findings made in respect of SAA.

**To read the research paper, [click here](#).**

## The New Age (TNA)

TNA was established by the Gupta family in June 2010 and TNA launched the New Age newspaper in December 2010. TNA conducted its business as a subsidiary of Oakbay Investments (Pty) Ltd, a company owned by the Gupta family and represented by Atul Gupta. TNA was responsible for the print media (the New Age newspaper), while Infinity Media (Pty) Ltd focused on the 24-hour television news channel, ANN7.

### According to the Commission's Report:

- An investigation was conducted on the unjustified public spending that took place between the state owned entities **of Eskom, Transnet and SAA, and the Gupta-owned media enterprise, TNA Media** (Pty) Ltd (TNA) between 2011 and 2017.
- During this period, TNA produced The New Age newspaper and a television show, in partnership with the SABC, known as The New Age Business Briefings or Breakfasts. **Government departments and state owned enterprises used scarce public resources to secure advertising in or sponsorships with TNA that defied logic** and legal requirements.
- TNA serves as an example of the way in which state capture took hold in South Africa. It shows the **extent of the Guptas' influence in the public sector** in South Africa as well as the Guptas' **strategy to replace officials not compliant with their looting scheme**.
- The Commission's investigations revealed how key role players enabled the project of state capture to take hold of these entities and thrive for a number of years **despite the existence of certain institutions designed to protect our democracy including Parliament**.

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- The evidence before the Commission paints a picture of a **calculated strategy by the Guptas** to appropriate public funds from state-owned enterprises.
- It was key to their efforts to have **facilitators within SOEs and government departments**, such as GCIS, who would ensure that the entities committed millions of Rands to the TNA despite there being no discernible value for the entities or government departments.
- Within the SOEs, **the facilitators required subordinates who would follow their instructions** and do what was necessary to ensure that the processes for contracting were adjusted so that TNA could benefit from these contracts.
- The **adjustments included** removing standard termination clauses; providing for upfront payments; misrepresenting the value of the contracts to watchdog bodies like Parliament and the Public Protector; and recasting the agreements as something different to what they really were so that they fell within the delegated authority of the facilitators.
- There seems to have been a significant **lack of checks and balances operating at the entities** that allowed this conduct to continue for as long as it did.

#### Research Paper: Key findings and recommendations: Part 1 The New Age

This paper provides a summary, in table form, of the recommendations in response to the findings made in respect of The New Age.

To read the research paper, [click here](#).

## South African Revenue Service (SARS)

The South African Revenue Service is the revenue service of the South African Government. It is mandated to collect revenue and ensure compliance with tax and customs legislation.

### According to the Commission's Report:

- The SARS evidence is a clear example of **how the private sector colluded with the Executive, including President Zuma, to capture an institution that was highly regarded internationally and render it ineffective**.
- SARS **investigatory and enforcement capacity presented a hurdle to those involved in organised crime**, and was, therefore, a target for those engaged in state capture. The involvement of the media, in perpetuating false narratives which discredited targeted people as well as providing grounds for their removal was a notable feature of the evidence led in the capture of SARS.
- SARS offers one of the **clearest demonstrations of state capture** as observed in other SOEs and state institutions. Reference can be made to the following features:

- The collusion between SARS, the Executive (including President Zuma) and the management consultancy Bain and Company with a planned and co-ordinated agenda to seize and restructure SARS, well in advance of the appointment of either Bain or Mr Tom Moyane, the former SARS Commissioner;
- The purging of competent top officials;
- The strategic positioning of compliant individuals;
- The restructuring and deliberate weakening of institutional functions, and
- The climate of fear and bullying.
- The **Nugent Commission** focused on irregularities at SARS while the Zondo Commission focused on state capture of public entities, including SARS. In the absence of any judicial review of the Nugent Commission, this Report accepts that the actual findings will stand and no evidence in contradiction of any such findings can be accepted.

#### Research Paper: Key findings and recommendations: Part 1 SARS

This paper provides a summary, in table form, of the recommendations in response to the findings made in respect of SARS.


To read the research paper, [click here](#).

## Public Procurement in SA

One of the reasons for the establishment of the Commission was to enquire into the working of public procurement in South Africa following widespread concerns that the system was rife with corruption. The Government is the single biggest procurer of goods and services in the country. The public procurement system must operate in a way which advances the national interest. It must do so in accordance with a system that is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and effective. International experience suggests that of all Government activities, public procurement is one of the most vulnerable to fraud and corruption.

### This Chapter of the Commission's Report:

- Identifies the **patterns of corruption which have been shown to exist in each stage and at every level of the procurement cycle**, calls attention to the associated collapse of governance in state departments as well as in state owned enterprises (SOEs), and points to structural weaknesses in the design and implementation of procurement, which facilitates corruption.
- **Provides a review of the procurement cycle as a whole in order to identify the points of systemic weaknesses**, which contributed to the growth and spread of corruption.
- Provides examples to illustrate:
  - The use of **political influence** for malign purposes;
  - The appointment of **pliable officials** to oversee the improper grant of tenders or contracts;
  - The **bullying or replacement of officials** who objected to irregular practices;

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- The **diversion of money**, being the proceeds of crime to the benefit of the ANC;
- The **collapse of governance** in SOEs;
- A **lack of transparency** and the growth of a **culture of impunity**;
- The **ineffectual nature of oversight and the absence of proper monitoring**;
- **The absence of consequences**, the readiness in which the implicated private sector entities initiated or participated in corrupt arrangement and the absence of any internal safeguards in the corporate structures.
- The Chapter **recommends remedial measures** to curb irregularities and the corrupt manipulation of the procurement system.

**Research Paper: Key findings and recommendations: Part 1 Public Procurement**

This paper provides a summary, in table form, of the recommendations in response to the findings made in respect of public procurement in South Africa.

To read the research paper, [click here](#).



PARLIAMENT  
 OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

On 24 June 2022, the Speaker of the National Assembly received a letter from the President that states that the full Report of the Commission will be submitted to Parliament, together with an indication of his intention on the implementation of the Commission's recommendations by no later than 22 October 2022. ATC No. 100-2022, dated 01 July 2022.

**NOTE:** Chief Justice Zondo has submitted a court application for corrections to some of the Volumes in Part 6, specifically to provide for; (i) the inclusion of the testimony of two additional witnesses and (ii) "certain wrong figures" that appear as reflecting funds diverted to the Gupta enterprise through local and international money-laundering networks. In response, the Presidency has stated that this may impact its ability to meet the deadline of 22 October 2022 to report to Parliament.

# STATE CAPTURE



## Timeline

### NOVEMBER 2017

Former Public Protector Adv. Thuli Madonsela recommended that Former President Zuma should appoint a commission of inquiry into state capture

### JANUARY 2018

The commission was formally established to begin its investigations

### AUGUST 2018

First hearing took place

### DECEMBER 2021

Final hearing took place after receiving eight extensions

### JUNE 2022

Final reports were published and handed over to President Ramaphosa by the Chief Justice (Reports 5 and 6)

Report 1 published 4 January 2022.  
 Report 2 published 1 February 2022.  
 Report 3 published 1 March 2022.  
 Report 4 published 29 April 2022

## Numbers

### PAGE NUMBERS

5437

### MONEY SPENT

1 Billion +

### HEARING DAYS

430

### NUMBER OF EXTENSIONS

8

### TOTAL NUMBER OF REPORTS/VOLUMES

6 reports divided into 16 volumes

### Part 1

Part 2: 2 volumes

Part 3: 4 volumes

Part 4: 4 volumes

Part 5: 2 volumes

Part 6: 4 volumes

Source: Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG)



**Chief Justice Zondo hands the final Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry on allegations of State Capture to President Ramaphosa**

Source: State Capture Commission

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### Research Paper: Recommendations: Part 2 (Vol.1 and 2): Transnet and Denel

This paper provides a summary, in table form, of the recommendations in response to the findings made in respect of Transnet and Denel Part 2 (Vol. 1-2) for further investigation by **law enforcements agencies**, with a view to possible prosecution. **To read the research paper, [click here.](#)**

## Transnet

**Transnet** is the proprietor of all rail, ports and pipelines in South Africa. Its principle objective is the optimal development of the freight system. In the period between 2010 and 2018 Transnet was involved in major procurement of locomotives, network services and infrastructure expansion.

### According to the Commission's Report:

- **The evidence established convincingly that state capture occurred at Transnet in the period between 2009 and 2018.** In many ways, Transnet can be considered to have been the Gupta's pilot project at capturing a State Owned Enterprise.
- **Transnet became a primary site of state capture.** This was accomplished primarily through the Gupta racketeering enterprise and those associated with it who engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity.
- State capture at Transnet involved a **systematic scheme** of securing illicit and corrupt influence or control over decision making.
- **Transnet contracts to the value of approximately R41.204 billion were irregularly awarded for the benefit of entities linked to the Gupta family.** This amount represents 72.21% of the total state payments in respect of contracts tainted by State capture.
- The Report notes **political interference** in key appointments, manipulation of procurement practices; collapse of governance; concentration of power in the hands of a few individuals and the side-lining of Transnet's own internal specialist expertise and capacity.
- Procurement has a legitimate transformation role to play in South Africa. The **ideals of empowerment were grossly manipulated** and abused to advance the interests of a few individuals. There was an abject and deliberate failure to ensure that businesses owned, particularly by previously disadvantaged South Africans, benefited from Transnet's massive procurement contracts.

### Research Paper: Executive Summary Part 2 (Vol.1): Transnet

This paper provides an executive summary of Part 2 (Vol. 1). **To read the research paper, [click here.](#)**

### Research Paper: Key findings and recommendations: Transnet

This paper provides a summary, in table form, of all the key findings and recommendations contained in Part 2 (Vol.1) pertaining to Transnet. The table provides a context to each recommendation and highlights the relevant Parliamentary sector required to oversee implementation of these recommendations. **To read the research paper, [click here.](#)**

## Denel

**Denel** was established in 1992 following an agreement between the Minister of Public Enterprises, the Minister of Defence, the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (Armcor) and Denel (Pty) Ltd. Denel is a manufacturer of military equipment. In 2011 a new Board of Denel was appointed. From a loss making situation from 2005-2010, Denel showed a profit from 2011-2015. In 2015 the Denel group was both solvent and liquid.

### The Commission Report concludes that:

- Denel must have appeared an **attractive target for capture**. It was showing a profit, had been given a clean audit and was praised by the Minister.
- The first step was to **remove the control** of Denel from the hands of a competent and honest Board.
- **Suspensions** by the 2015 Board of key executives in Denel was to remove an obstacle from the path of the Guptas.
- The entry of Mr Essa (a Gupta associate) and the Guptas into VR Laser, the former premier supplier of steel armour plate within South Africa, was conceived for the purpose of using VR Laser as a vehicle to achieve the capture of Denel. The Guptas were not prepared to compete for Denel's business.
- The **reputational damage which** Denel suffered from its capture and the fact that control of Denel passed into unscrupulous hands was enormous. The evidence shows that rebuilding Denel will take a long time. That is if Denel does not go under. Denel has been reported as facing liquidation and having trouble paying its employees.

### Research Paper: Executive Summary Part 2 (Vol.2): Denel

This paper provides an executive summary of Part 2 (Vol. 2). **To read the research paper, [click here.](#)**

### Research Paper: Key findings and recommendations: Denel

This paper provides a summary, in table form, of all the key findings and recommendations contained in Part 2 (Vol.2) pertaining to Denel. The table provides a context to each recommendation and highlights the relevant Parliamentary sector required to oversee implementation of these recommendations. **To read the research paper, [click here.](#)**

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### Research Paper: Recommendations: Part 3 (Vol. 1-4): Bosasa

This paper provides a summary, in table form, of all the recommendations contained in Part 3 (Vol.1-4) pertaining to Bosasa. The table provides a context to each recommendation and highlights the relevant Parliamentary sector required to oversee implementation of these recommendations. [To read the research paper, click here.](#)

## BOSASA Group of Companies

### The Commission's investigations and findings in respect of Bosasa reveal that:

- Bosasa was a business organisation that was heavily invested in securing tenders from Government departments and organs of state. **Bosasa's primary mechanism in attempting to influence functionaries, public officials and public office bearers was the payment of cash bribes.** This was no doubt aimed at developing a corrupt form of loyalty to Bosasa.
- However, the attempts to influence through inducement or gain were not confined to cash payments. **Bosasa built houses, provided furnishings, installed home security systems, purchased motor vehicles, bought gifts and paid for travel and accommodation.**
- Bosasa (and the Watson family) established a reasonably well-organised network of well-placed, well-connected and powerful people whose loyalty was secured with financial and other material incentives and bribes.
- The balance of evidence overwhelmingly establishes that Bosasa, its directors and some of the employees, along with persons and entities associated with it were involved, **on an industrial scale**, in attempts to influence, through inducement or gain, members of the National Executive and office bearers and functionaries of, or employed by, state institutions and organs of state.
- **Members of the National Executive, public officials and functionaries of various organs of state influenced the award of tenders to benefit themselves, their families or entities in which they held a personal interest.** There was massive corruption in the awarding of tenders and contracts to Bosasa and its affiliates.
- **It is estimated that the aggregate value of contracts awarded to the Bosasa group by various public departments and entities between 2000 and 2016 to be at least R2.37 billion and approximately R75.7 million was paid out in bribes.**
- The evidence reveals that there was widespread corruption in the awarding of contracts and tenders to Bosasa and its associated business entities or organisations by Government departments, SOEs, agencies and entities. **Corruption was central to Bosasa's business model.** Where contracts were not awarded as a result of corruption, corruption would creep in once they had been awarded to ensure their retention and their extension or renewal. These contracts spanned at least a 17-year period.
- Bosasa's tenders/contracts included those with **SASOL, South African Post Office, Airport Company South Africa, the Departments of Correctional Services, Justice and Constitutional Development, Home Affairs, Education, Social Development and Transport, the Department of Health in the Mpumalanga Provincial Government; and contracts at Municipal Level.**

### The evidence also revealed:

- **What was done in order to ensure that investigations by law enforcement agencies against Bosasa either got nowhere or that Bosasa and its Directors and officials were not prosecuted, even when investigations were conducted and finalised.**
- That the state may have received some value for money in certain contracts but not in others. Moreover, the relationship with Bosasa had significant longer term economic consequences, for example the budgetary impact of outsourcing and inflated pricing, particularly on a department such as the Department of Correctional Services.
- That Bosasa did not have broad based black economic empowerment in its companies. This is directly antithetical to the existing legislative framework and Government policy, which seeks to facilitate access to economic opportunities, particularly for those previously disadvantaged by apartheid policies and laws.
- Tax evasion, including a failure to declare income and false invoicing.
- That Bosasa also provided extensive funding of 'war rooms' during certain election periods in an apparent effort to influence senior government officials.
- The intimidation of journalists.
- Sidelining of those public servants within the system that tried to stand against the corrupt activities of Bosasa and its enablers and facilitators.

### Research Paper: Executive Summary Part 3 (Vol.1 -4): Bosasa


This paper provides an executive summary of Part 3 (Vol.1-4). [To read the research paper, click here.](#)

### Research Paper: Key findings and recommendations (Justice and NPA): Bosasa

This paper provides a summary, in table form, of all the key findings and recommendations contained in Part 3 (Vol.1-4) pertaining to the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development and the National Prosecuting Authority, in terms of implicated officials within these departments. The table provides a context to each recommendation and highlights the relevant Parliamentary sector required to oversee implementation of these recommendations. [To read the research paper, click here.](#)

### Research Paper: Key findings and recommendations (Correctional Services): Bosasa

This paper provides a summary, in table form, of all the key findings and recommendations contained in Part 3 (Vol.1-4) pertaining to the Department of Correctional Services, in terms of implicated officials and others. The table provides a context to each recommendation and highlights the relevant Parliamentary sector required to oversee implementation of these recommendations. [To read the research paper, click here.](#)

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### Research Paper: Executive Summary: Part 4 (Vol. 1- 4): National Treasury, EOH and the City of JHB, Alexkor, Free State Asbestos Project, Free State Housing Project and Eskom

This paper provides an executive summary of Part 4 (Volumes 1-4) pertaining to National Treasury, EOH and the City of JHB, Alexkor, Free State Asbestos Project, Free State Housing Project and Eskom. [To read the research paper, click here.](#)

## The Attempted Capture of National Treasury

- National Treasury neatly fell into the wrong hands, particularly during the difficult four days in December 2015 following Minister Nene's dismissal and Mr Des Van Rooyen's appointment as Minister of Finance. Mr Van Rooyen, (and his two Gupta affiliated advisors) Mr Bobat and Mr Whitley were already inside the country's National Treasury. Mr Bobat and Mr Whitley had begun to send National Treasury's confidential documents to the Gupta's and their associates outside of National Treasury.
- **It is almost a miracle that National Treasury was saved from the tentacles of the Guptas.**
- **The Report makes a specific recommendation for further investigation by law enforcement agencies.**

## EOH and the City of Johannesburg

- The Commission focused on contracts awarded between EOH and the City of Johannesburg.
- Recurrent features of the irregular procurement in which EOH was involved, included:
  - The over invoicing of public sector clients and inflation of prices.
  - Politically connected intermediaries as conduits for kickbacks.
  - Substantial payments to sub-contractors who appeared to have performed no material work on contracts.
- **The Report recommends a number of matters for further investigation by law enforcement agencies and prosecution by the NPA.**

## Alexkor


- Scarlet Sky Investments (SSI) was appointed in 2015, by a joint venture between Alexkor and the Richtersveld community, called the Pooling and Sharing Joint Venture (PSJV), to market and sell diamonds.
- **The Commission identified significant irregularities with the appointment of SSI. SSI was a dormant company with no diamond licence or track record in the diamond industry. The evidence reveals that SSI had links to the Gupta enterprise.**
- The Commission investigators established that the key executives and senior employees of Alexkor and the PSJV had links or contacts with the associates of the Gupta enterprise.
- **The Commission identified possible contraventions of the Diamonds Act and Companies Act and its recommendations include further investigations by law enforcement agencies and prosecutions by the NPA.**

## Free State Asbestos Project Debacle

- The purpose of the project was for the eradication of asbestos from the roofs of houses provided by the Free State Provincial Government. The houses were mostly those that belonged to or were occupied by poor people.
- **The conceptualisation and implementation of this project suggest that it was a considerable scam from its inception.**
- This contract was not entered into in a regular or lawful manner. After receiving an unsolicited proposal, the Provincial Department of Human Settlements gave the job to **Blackhead Consulting/Diamond Hill Trading Joint Venture**, without following any competitive bidding processes.
- **The project failed to provide any benefit to any resident of the province other than two businessmen and certain high ranking Government officials.**
- For actual costs of perhaps R15 million on the Asbestos Project, the Department handed over R230 million of taxpayer's money and was prepared to pay R255 million. **Profits were pocketed by all concerned.**
- **The Report makes a number of recommendations including for various legislative amendments, recovery of monies, as well as further investigation by law enforcement agencies and prosecution by the NPA.**

## Free State R1 Billion Housing Project Debacle

- In 2010/11 the Free State Province was supposed to build thousands of low cost houses. However, most of these houses were not built.
- The Province spent over R500 million by giving more than 100 contractors advance payments before any work was done. None of the contractors were appointed as a result of a competitive bidding process.
- **There was ultimately a significant loss and wastage of public funds to the detriment of the poor sector of the Free State community meant to benefit from those funds.**
- There was no timeous intervention on the part of the authorities of the Free State government, including the Premier, to prevent or curtail such misappropriation of funds.
- **The Report makes a number of recommendations including recovery of monies and further investigations by law enforcement agencies.**

[Research Paper: Findings and recommendations: Part 4 \(Vol. 1 and 2\): National Treasury, EOH and the City of JHB, Alexkor, Free State Asbestos Project, Free State Housing Project on next page.](#) 

## The attempt to Capture National Treasury, EOH and the City of Johannesburg, Alexkor, Free State Asbestos Project and Free State Housing Project

### Research Paper: Findings and recommendations: Part 4 (Vol. 1 and 2): National Treasury, EOH and the City of JHB, Alexkor, Free State Asbestos Project, Free State Housing Project

This paper provides a summary, in table form, of all the general recommendations contained in Part 4 (Vol.1-2) The table provides a context to each recommendation and highlights the relevant Parliamentary sector required to oversee implementation of these recommendations. **To read the research paper, [click here.](#)**

## PART 4 (VOLUME 3 - 4) Eskom

### The Capture of Eskom

- Eskom is South Africa main power utility. **Much of the woes in which Eskom finds itself stem from corruption perpetrated by Eskom's own executives and managers in the field of procurement.**
- **The evidence proves a scheme by the Guptas to capture Eskom, install the Guptas' selected candidates in positions of strategic importance within Eskom as members of the Board, the committees of the Board and executives at Eskom so as to then be able to divert Eskom's financial resources to themselves, their entities and their associates.**
- The President of the country, Mr Jacob Zuma, and Minister of Public Enterprises (at the time) Ms Lynne Brown were manipulating the situation at Eskom to advance the business interests of the Guptas. It is apparent that Ms Lynne Brown stuffed the Denel Board and the Eskom Board with many Gupta associates. **South Africans thought that the Government was in control of Eskom but it was not. It had relinquished control to the Guptas and those people the Guptas wanted.**
- Messrs Molefe, Koko and Singh were Gupta agents who were prepared to do the Guptas' bidding when required to do so.
- **In total, R14.7 billion of Eskom's contracts are calculated to have been afflicted by State Capture, according to the Flow of Funds' investigation.**
- The Report identifies: evidence of various contraventions of the PFMA; potentially corrupt activities; fraud; theft; and money laundering; and the failure by the Portfolio Committee on Public Enterprises to hold the Board, the Minister and the Cabinet accountable for what was happening at Eskom.

### Research Paper: Findings and recommendations: Part 4 (Vol. 3 and 4): Eskom

This paper provides a summary, in table form, of all the general recommendations contained in Part 4 (Vol.3-4) pertaining to Eskom. The table provides a context to each recommendation and highlights the relevant Parliamentary sector required to oversee implementation of these recommendations. **To read the research paper, [click here.](#)**

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### State Security Agency (SSA)

- The SSA evidence has shown how vulnerabilities in the regulatory framework make the intelligence services especially susceptible to abuse for improper political and personal gain.
- **The SSA evidence highlights the critical role of oversight bodies mandated by the Constitution, including: The Inspector-General of Intelligence (IGI); the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI); and the Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA).**
- **The evidence suggests that this Commission may not in fact have been necessary if the SSA had detected, fully investigated and countered state capture as a threat to our constitutional order when the symptoms of state capture first appeared.**
- The evidence has shown that there was a centralisation of authority and a restructuring of the SSA, while officially sanctioned processes were transgressed, side-lined or simply ignored. Together with the failure of oversight mechanisms, this paved the way for the carrying out of intelligence operations which were clearly illegal.
- **There is a discernible pattern that investigations into wrongdoing at the SSA are interfered with and eventually stopped.** Alternatively, they continued until completion but are never acted upon and the findings remain recommendations which are never implemented.
- **The JSCI failed to properly perform its oversight duty in respect of the SSA.**
- **The Commission made various recommendations, including:** that the role played by Mr Thulani Dlomo, Mr David Mahlobo, Mr Arthur Fraser and other people involved in the withdrawal, handling and distribution of SSA's money, should be looked into by the law enforcement agencies and Parliament should exercise its oversight role properly and fully.

### Crime Intelligence

- The Commission considered the Criminal Intelligence (CI) unit, a unit within the South African Police Services (SAPS) and the Secret Services Account, **a financial account administered from within the CI. The evidence revealed massive corruption and theft of public funds.**
- **For an extended period, corruption, nepotism, theft and fraud, particularly in relation to the Secret Service Account administered by Crime Intelligence, was conducted on such a scale that it can justly be described as looting.**
- Where secret state funds fall under the control of scoundrels, as the present case makes clear, **only strong oversight institutions can protect the public** against the harm that such scoundrels can inflict.
- **The Commission made various recommendations, including:** The IGI and AG be given access to relevant SSA records and to the secret accounts referred to in this Report as may be lawful and any investigations into corrupt conduct within CI continue without any obstruction and receive the appropriate support from all units within SAPS.

[Research Papers on Part 5 \(Vol. 1\): on next page.](#) 

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### Research Paper: Executive Summary of Part 5 (Vol. 1): SSA and Crime Intelligence

This paper provides an executive summary of Part 5 (Vol. 1). [To read the research paper, click here.](#)

#### Research Paper: Key findings and recommendations: SSA and Crime Intelligence

This paper provides a summary, in table form, of all the key findings and recommendations contained in Part 5 (Vol. 1) pertaining to the Secret Service Agency (SSA) and Crime Intelligence. The table provides a context to each recommendation and highlights the relevant Parliamentary sector required to oversee implementation of these recommendations.

[To read the research paper, click here.](#)

## The Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA)

- A pattern developed at PRASA that **allowed influential individuals and/or entities in which they or their family members had an interest to benefit unduly, especially in respect of the procurement of goods and services.**
- When a few men and women tried to resist this and insist on compliance with the law or doing the right things, they were unfairly suspended or dismissed or their lives were made difficult. **People who wielded public power, whether as leaders of the ruling party, Cabinet Ministers, Members of Parliament or members of law enforcement agencies were obstructive, refused to assist or simply stood by when there was a duty, whether constitutional, legal or moral, to actively assist the Board.**
- The Report is scathing in its criticism on the lack of progress by the DPCI in the investigations of criminal complaints laid many years ago by PRASA.
- The Report found that Parliament failed to hold the Executive to account and allowed it to punish a Board that sought to fight corruption and maladministration. The Report recommends that **Parliament introduces mechanisms to prevent abuse of power by the Executive.** The Report also found that Members of the Portfolio Committee on Transport have hardly covered themselves in glory in their handling of PRASA related matters.
- The Report also recommends the establishment of a **special commission of inquiry** to examine, why PRASA was allowed to slide into almost total ruin, who should be held responsible and who could have benefited from that unacceptable state of affairs.

### Research Paper: Executive Summary Part 5 (Vol. 2): SABC, Waterkloof landing, PRASA

This paper provides an executive summary of Part 5 (Vol. 2). [To read the research paper, click here.](#)

#### Research Paper: Key findings and recommendations: SABC, Waterkloof landing, PRASA

This paper provides a summary, in table form, of all the key findings and recommendations contained in Part 5 (Vol. 2) pertaining to the SABC, Waterkloof landing and PRASA. The table provides a context to each recommendation and highlights the relevant Parliamentary sector required to oversee implementation of these recommendations.

[To read the research paper, click here.](#)


## PART 5 (VOLUME 2): SABC, Waterkloof Landing and PRASA

### The South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC)

- The Commission found that the **contract between the SABC and TNA Media (Pty) Ltd on the TNA Breakfast Briefings** was irregular and was created for the benefit of TNA media and/or the members of the Gupta family to the detriment of the mandate that the SABC has towards the public.
- **The Commission made various recommendations, including** around the abuse of office by the former Minister of Communications, Ms Faith Muthumbi and former President Zuma; as well as recommendations for the recovery of funds (from the assets held by the Gupta family, and from Mr Hlaudi Motsoeneng); and further investigations with a view to possible criminal prosecution of Mr Motsoeneng and Ms Lulama Mokhobo.

### The Waterkloof Landing

- **No recommendations are made** with regard to the Waterkloof Air Force Base landing.
- However, the report notes that the Waterkloof saga, for which Ambassador Koloane was responsible, has served to starkly demonstrate to the media and the wider public the scandalous influence that the Guptas exercised in the highest office in the Republic and how they shamelessly flaunted it.

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**Note: Chief Justice Zondo has submitted a court application for corrections to some of the Volumes in Part 6, specifically to provide for; (i) the inclusion of the testimony of two additional witnesses and (ii) “certain wrong figures” that appear as reflecting funds diverted to the Gupta enterprise through local and international money-laundering networks. In response, the Presidency stated that this may impact its ability to meet the deadline of 22 October 2022 to report to Parliament.**

## Vrede/Estina

- A key deliverable for the **Vrede Dairy Project** in the Free State Province was to introduce a model of using local farmers to farm dairy cows, process their milk and sell milk products into the provincial and national dairy products market. This objective was to be achieved with the empowerment of local Black farmers from the Memel and Vrede areas. **The promise made to those farmers was never realised.**
- A company named Estina was appointed as the implementing agent for the Vrede Dairy Project without the Supply Chain Management processes being followed. **Estina had no experience whatsoever in farming.**
- **The project was a complete disaster and the total disbursed to Estina was R280 million of taxpayers' money by the time the agreement was cancelled. Furthermore, the monies that were paid to Estina were then paid to entities belonging to, or related with the Gupta family.**
- Those involved **collaborated and colluded in siphoning and channelling public coffers to an incompetent entity without a shred of accountability.**
- **There must be consequences for people who fail to do their job. Otherwise, this corruption and these acts of state capture are going to continue forever to the detriment of the country and all people.**
- The Report makes specific recommendations including for further investigations by law enforcement agencies and prosecutions of various individuals by the NPA and the recovery of funds.

### Research Paper: Executive Summary: Part 6 (Vol. 1): Vrede/Estina and Closure of Accounts

This paper provides an executive summary of Part 6 (Vol. 1)

To read the research paper, [click here](#).

### Research Paper: General recommendations: Vrede/Estina and Closure of Accounts

This paper provides a summary, in table form, of all the recommendations contained in Part 6 (Vol. 1) pertaining to Vrede/Estina and Closure of Accounts. The table provides a context to each recommendation and highlights the relevant Parliamentary sector required to oversee implementation of these recommendations.

To read the research paper, [click here](#).

## Closure of bank accounts of Gupta Companies

- In 2015 and 2016 four banks closed the bank accounts of companies owned or controlled by or linked to the Gupta family.
- **It is clear beyond any reasonable doubt that the Guptas, and their politically connected enablers, had embarked on a coordinated campaign to loot the South African state coffers and, until the banks stopped them from doing so, were using the banks as their vehicles for this purpose.** It is equally clear that, when this looting became notorious in the public sphere, the banks were obliged by law to act against the Guptas and did so for that reason.
- The banks should, therefore, not be criticised for acting against the Guptas. **If anything, the three banks which delayed their closure decisions until April 2016 might have been interrogated as to why it had taken them so long to act.**
- The Inter-Ministerial Task Team improperly intervened in the matter of the closing of the bank facilities of the Gupta owned companies to advance the cause of the Guptas.
- **President Zuma and Mr Zwane misused their public power in an attempt to achieve a benefit for the Guptas.** This conduct on the part of Mr Zuma and Mr Zwane ought to be deplored and condemned both as a violation of the powers vested in them by the Constitution and as a breach of the Executive Ethics Code.
- The Report makes a specific recommendation that relevant existing legislation governing banks be amended to introduce a requirement of fairness or new legislation be enacted.



PARLIAMENT  
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## State Capture Defined

- **Corruption may be part of state capture but state capture is more than that. State capture, at least in theory, concerns a network of relationships, both inside and outside government, whose objective is to ensure the exercise of undue influence over decision-making in government and organs of the state, for private and unlawful gain.**
- **Procurement is often a focus for state capture as public procurement can be a major source of economic rents for firms closely tied to politicians and political parties.**
- **State-Owned Enterprises are used to cement the ties between politicians and private actors. They are often critical transmission mechanisms through which state capture occurs.**
- The crucial point about state capture is the combination of corrupt and unlawful actions that subvert the entire democratic political system. At root, state capture is a manifestation of a conflict of interest. Private individuals or firms seek to engage politicians and public sector actors through the provision of private benefits to shape public decisions in their interests.
- **Much of the evidence presented to the Commission indicates that state capture in the South African context evolved as a project by which a relatively small group of actors, together with their network of collaborators inside and outside of the state, conspired systematically (criminally and in defiance of the Constitution) to redirect resources from the state for their own gain.** This was facilitated by a deliberate effort to exploit or weaken key state institutions and public entities, but also including law enforcement institutions and the intelligence services.

## President Matamela Cyril Ramaphosa's Evidence

- President Ramaphosa has conceded the existence of corruption, the existence of state capture, and the role of the ANC therein. He has conceded not only that there has been corruption, but that it is both continuing and pervasive, in government and in the party.
- President Ramaphosa spoke of what he referred to as contestation about the meaning of State Capture as a concept. **It is difficult to understand how contestations about the nature of State Capture would have prevented the ANC from investigating or taking action in regard to some very straight-forward allegations concerning corruption and fraud.** Nor was it made clear how this contestation or debate was able to prevent the party, or party structures, from acting on these allegations for over five years.
- In the Commissions view, if President Ramaphosa had spoken out - and he did not need to have been confrontational - and spoken out firmly against state and wrongdoing, and President Zuma fired him, that stance could have given hope to a lot of other members of the Cabinet who may have been looking for someone to lead in this regard.

## The Role of the Ruling Party

- Understanding the role of the African National Congress ("ANC") is vital to understanding State Capture in South Africa. It has been the only governing party since the advent of democracy in South Africa in 1994, and specifically during the years under review.
- **The evidence shows that there was a determined resistance and unwillingness on the part of the ANC in Parliament for Parliament to investigate and exercise oversight in relation to allegations of state capture.**
- The recurring theme is that the ANC prioritises its own survival and strength over the interests of the country. **The Constitutional framework - including Members of Parliament's (MPs) oaths of office - does not allow MPs to vote according to the party's wishes if they believed that to do so would be against the interests of the people of South Africa.**
- The runaway vehicle" of state capture, as President Ramaphosa put it, did cause untold harm. **A vast amount of damage to the country's institutions and fiscus was already done by the time the party decided to initiate Parliamentary enquiries, and later on decided to recall its President Mr Zuma.** The evidence here is unequivocal.
- What needs to be said about the ANC and its contribution to state capture is that it opposed proposals by opposition parties for Parliament to establish public inquiries to investigate allegations of corruption and wrong doing by the Guptas and yet it did not itself make any investigations because it said it did not have capacity to investigate the allegations against President Zuma and the Guptas. In that way the Guptas continued to pursue state capture to the detriment of the people of South Africa. **If the ANC had not opposed the establishment of those inquiries, the Guptas' agenda of state capture could have been stopped and South Africa might not have lost the billions of Rands that it lost.**

### Research Paper: Executive Summary Part 6 (Vol. 2)

This paper provides an executive summary of Part 6 (Vol. 2). [To read the research paper, click here.](#)

### Research Paper: Key findings and recommendations: State Capture defined, the President's evidence, the role of the ruling party and parliamentary oversight.

This paper provides a summary, in table form, of all the key findings and recommendations contained in Part 6 (Vol. 2). The table provides a context to each recommendation and highlights the relevant Parliamentary sector required to oversee implementation of these recommendations.

[To read the research paper, click here.](#)

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## Parliamentary Oversight

- Parliament is clearly not obliged to investigate or enquire into every allegation of public sector corruption or every allegation of malfeasance within the executive branch of Government, particularly where the evidence is scant. **However, Parliament does have obligations under the Constitution to scrutinize and oversee executive action, to maintain oversight of the exercise of the national executive authority and to ensure all executive organs of state are accountable to it.**
- Allegations of state capture and or improper influence by the Gupta brothers have long been in the public domain. Some degree of effective Parliamentary oversight in relation to such allegations *commenced* in about mid-2017. Before that, the record is disturbing. **Even after mid-2017 the Parliamentary oversight record was patchy.**
- **No Parliamentary inquiry into the allegations of improper Gupta influence took place in 2013, or indeed before mid-2017. It is difficult to accept that Members of Parliament did not yet have sufficient cause to probe the veracity of the allegations of improper Gupta influence by 2013, at the latest.**
- **Widely publicized allegations of state capture came to a head in early 2016;** but the ANC was unwilling to support requests by opposition parties for a Portfolio Committee or an ad hoc committee to inquire into those allegations. **The fact that these allegations had been referred to the South African Police Service or Chapter Nine institutions does not excuse Parliament's inaction.**
- Members of Parliament are bound by their oath of office or affirmation to be faithful to the Republic and obey, respect and uphold the Constitution and all other laws of the Republic. **Leaving it exclusively to other agencies to investigate and, if necessary to take action regarding these allegations at this time was not in the Commission's view consistent with Parliament's responsibilities.**
- The all too frequent failure of the Executive to implement recommendations in Parliamentary reports is attributable to a lack of political will by the Executive to address the problems identified. **That Parliament failed to compel the Executive to address the problems identified in its reports suggests similar lack of political will on its part.**
- **The Report made a range of recommendations to improve parliamentary oversight which included:** a Parliamentary Committee to exercise oversight over the President; ensuring adequate funding for Portfolio Committees; the need for a Parliamentary mechanism to track and monitor; enhancing Parliament's role in key appointment processes; and developing specialized Committees to deal with issues that cut across Departments and Ministries.

## Public Funds Diverted to the Gupta Enterprise

- From at least 2011 onwards, Government departments and State Owned Enterprises (SOE's) were targeted for capture by the Gupta Enterprise. This led to the awarding of a vast array of contracts and the payment of billions of rand to entities paying kickbacks to, or controlled by, the Gupta Enterprise.
- A wide range of organs of state experienced the impact of State Capture, but **the financial effect was focused on Transnet and Eskom who together, account for more than 97% of all the expenditure tainted by State Capture.** The Commission calculated an aggregate amount of R57.26 billion as the total payments made to contractors in contracts with the state in which the Gupta Enterprise was involved in State Capture activities.
- **Of the 8 categories of losses defined by the Commission it has been able to quantify only one category with some accuracy – the kickbacks.** Which the Commission has determined had a total known value of **R8.14 billion.**
- The Commission has not attempted to quantify the other seven categories of loss. **So the Report does not purport to quantify the total loss suffered to the State as a result of Gupta related state capture. It can safely be predicted, however, that this amount would far exceed the amount of R15.54 billion that was paid directly or indirectly from public funds to entities forming part of the Gupta Enterprise.**

## Dissipation of State Capture-Derived Funds through Money Laundering Networks

- The Gupta enterprise used a range of different money laundering networks to dissipate the funds it generated from State Capture.
- To begin with the Gupta Enterprise externalised its State Capture profits with simple money laundering devices. **From around 2013, the Gupta Enterprise started to use sophisticated domestic and international money laundering to move its proceeds of crimes against the South African state.**
- The act of tracing State Capture funds has led to the identification of 12 companies that performed the function of onshore-offshore bridges for established money laundering networks in South Africa. **The volume of funds leaving South Africa through these routes is extremely alarming.**

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- A large number of the onshore-offshore bridges were identified by the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) and subject to seizure orders. **However, the NPA does not appear to have instituted any money laundering prosecutions arising out of the SARB investigations.**
- **If money laundering is to be brought under control in South Africa, it is essential that those controlling and participating in the domestic money laundering networks in South Africa are prosecuted and subjected to asset forfeiture proceedings so that the costs of the money laundering profession can be made to outweigh its benefits.**
- **In response to its findings the Commission has made recommendations that include:** the FIC and the NPA engage with their counterparts in Hong Kong, China and the UAE to seek their assistance in the tracing and dissipation of funds and the Asset Forfeiture Unit should approach its counterparts in the relevant jurisdictions with a view towards having proceeds of state capture frozen.

## The Acquisition of the Optimum Coal Mine

- The acquisition of Optimum Coal Holdings Ltd (“OCH”) by Tegeta Exploration and Resources (Pty) Ltd (“Tegeta”) is part of what triggered the establishment of the Commission. That acquisition was the central focus of the Public Protector’s investigation that culminated in her October 2016 “State of Capture” Report.
- **The investigations of the Commission have borne out the findings of the Public Protector in relation to the acquisition of Optimum Coal Holdings (OCH). This acquisition was a State Capture project pursued through unlawful means and funded almost entirely by proceeds of crime.**
- The criminal project to acquire OCH involved various steps all of which appear to have been performed under the improper influence of the Gupta family/ and /or Mr Salim Essa.
- **The Commission has recommended that:** Mr Duduzane Zuma, Mr Salim Essa, Ms Ronica Ravagan, Mr Ashu Chawla; and members of the Gupta family be investigated by law enforcement authorities for possible contraventions of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act (POCA) 121 of 1998.

## Various Individuals and Topics

- The Commission considered the evidence of Lord Peter Hain, Ms Mabel Petronella Mentor and Mr Brian Currin. It made certain findings in respect of Mr Duduzane’s role in State Capture; former President Jacob Zuma’s removal of Mr Mxolisi Nxasana as National Director of Public Prosecutions; and the Gupta’s priori knowledge of the appointment of Mr Mbalula as Minister of Sport and Recreation.
- The Commission also considered the **Water Purification Project involving Intaka and the KwaZulu-Natal Government** and the roles played by the two members of the Executive Councils in the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Government namely, Mr Michael Mabuyakhulu and Ms Peggy Nelisiwe Nkonyeni.
- In respect of the **Department of Public Enterprises governance of State Owned Enterprises** the Commission was of the view that: **We cannot keep doing things the same way they have been done over a long period with the consequences that the country has suffered in terms of SOEs.**
- **The Commission has recommended that: the law enforcement agencies conduct investigations and a Standing Appointment and Oversight Committee should be established** to consider senior appointments at SOEs.

### Research Paper: Executive Summary Part 6 (Vol.3):

This paper provides an executive summary of Part 6 (Vol. 3). **To read the research paper, [click here.](#)**

### Research Paper: Key findings and recommendations: Public Funds Diverted to the Gupta Enterprise; Dissipation of State Capture-Derived Funds through Money Laundering Networks; the acquisition of the Optimum Coal Mine; and Various Individuals and Topics

This paper provides a summary, in table form, of all the key findings and recommendations contained in Part 6 (Vol. 3). The table provides a context to each recommendation and highlights the relevant Parliamentary sector required to oversee implementation of these recommendations.

**To read the research paper, [click here.](#)**

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**REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO STATE CAPTURE**

**Part 1 (I)**

[Report 1 Volume 1-3 - SAA, New Age, SARS and Public Procurement](#)

**Part 2 (II)**

[Report 2 Volume 1 - Transnet](#)  
[Report 2 Volume 2 - Denel](#)

**Part 3 (III)**

[Report 3 Volume 1 - Bosasa](#)  
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[Report 3 Volume 4 - Bosasa](#)

**Part 4 (IV)**

[Report 4 Volume 1 - National Treasury, EOH, Alexkor](#)  
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[Report 4 Volume 3 - Eskom 1](#)  
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
**Part 5 (V)**

[Report 5 Volume 1 – SSA and Crime Intelligence](#)  
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**Part 6 (VI)**

[Report 6 Volume 1 – Vrede/Estina and Account Closure](#)  
[Report 6 Volume 2 - President, ANC, Parliament](#)  
[Report 6 Volume 3 - Flow of Funds and Optimum Coal](#)  
[Report 6 Volume 4 - All Recommendations](#)

**“WHERE WAS PARLIAMENT?” A PMG Review of Parliamentary Oversight in Light of State Capture and the Zondo Report**



The Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) monitors parliamentary committees, with the purpose of making them accessible, to enable all sectors of society to follow parliamentary proceedings, intervene in the policy and law-making process and monitor committee oversight of government entities. **Authors:** *Monique Doyle* is the Monitor and Projects Manager at PMG. *Jennifer Rault-Smith* is a Senior Monitor at PMG. *Rashaad Ali* is the Executive Director at PMG. Published by PMG in August 2022. To access the report, [click here](#).

The **Civil Society Working Group on State Capture** was established in November 2018 and is a coalition of over 23 civil society organisations. The mandate of the Working Group has been to both support and strengthen the work of the Zondo Commission (State Capture Commission of Inquiry) while maintaining oversight over the Commission in the interests of the public. The Working Group has achieved this through various means using advocacy, engagement with the Commission and by making over 15 evidence-based submissions to the Commission.

**Open Secrets** acts as the secretariat of the Civil Society Working Group on State Capture.

Source: Open Secrets Website

[Click here to read more about the Civil Society Working Group.](#)

**Reports by Open Secrets**

**Open Secrets** is a non-profit organisation which exposes and builds accountability for private sector economic crimes through investigative research, advocacy, and the law. Open Secrets has published three investigative reports on state capture.

The **Enablers** report was co-authored by Open Secrets and Shadow World Investigations, and shows that the systems that enable grand corruption and state capture are global in nature, and that private sector elites and professionals are central to the problem. [Click here to read...](#)

The **Wanted** Report traces the networks of capture and corruption at the Passenger Rail Agency of SA, SA Airways, Denel and the SA Revenue Service, and identifies the looters, fixers and politicians who should now be held to account. [Click here to read...](#)

Finally, the **Bad Cops, Bad Lawyers** report exposes the law enforcement officers at the National Prosecuting Authority and Hawks who failed to do their jobs, and shows that many remain in office, overseeing state capture investigations and prosecutions. [Click here to read...](#)



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## Feedback



**For any comments or feedback,  
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