

Friday, 26 June 2026]

No 112—2026] THIRD SESSION, SEVENTH PARLIAMENT

PARLIAMENT

OF THE

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

ANNOUNCEMENTS,

TABLINGS AND

COMMITTEE REPORTS

FRIDAY, 26 JUNE 2026

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ANNOUNCEMENTS

National Assembly and National Council of Provinces

1. Bills passed – to be submitted to President for assent..... 2

National Assembly

1. Referral to Committees of papers tabled..... 2

TABLINGS

National Assembly

1. Speaker 2

COMMITTEE REPORTS

National Council of Provinces

1. Agriculture, Land Reform and Mineral Resources 3

ANNOUNCEMENTS

National Assembly and National Council of Provinces

The Speaker and the Chairperson

1. Bills passed by Houses – to be submitted to President for assent

(1) Bill passed by National Council of Provinces on 26 June 2026:

(a) **Appropriation Bill** [B4–2026] (National Assembly – sec 77).

National Assembly

The Speaker

1. Referral to Committees of papers tabled

(1) The following paper is referred to the **Joint Standing Committee on Financial Management of Parliament** for consideration:

(a) Revised Annual Performance Plan and Budget of Parliament of the Republic of South Africa for 2026/27.

TABLINGS

National Assembly

1. The Speaker

(a) Reply by Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition to *Report of Portfolio Committee on Trade, Industry and Competition on Vote 39, Trade, Industry and Competition*.

Referred to **Portfolio Committee on Trade, Industry and Competition**.

COMMITTEE REPORTS

National Council of Provinces

1. Report of the Foot and Mouth Disease Workshop co-hosted by the Select Committee on Agriculture, Land Reform, and Mineral Resources and the Gauteng Provincial Legislature, report dated 23 June 2026

The Select Committee on Agriculture, Land Reform, and Mineral Resources co-hosted a Foot and Mouth Disease Workshop with the Gauteng Provincial Legislature, attended by legislatures of all other provinces from 28 February 2026 to 2 March 2026.

The delegation consisted of the following members of Parliament, Ms MG Modise (Chairperson, ANC), Mr BJ Farmer (PA), Mr M Montwedi (EFF), Ms SL Sithole (ANC), Mr HJ Van Den Berg (FF+), Ms HS Boshoff and Parliamentary support staff, Mr AA Bawa (Committee Secretary), Mr J Jooste (Content Advisor), Ms J Le Roux (Researcher), Ms B Mfecane (Executive Secretary), Ms Y Landu (Media Specialist) and apologies from Mr SP Mabilo, Mrs MB Ndlangisa Nodada, Ms MG Dhlamini and Mr NH Pienaar.

1. Department Presentations

1.1. The Department provided feedback about the current status of the latest FMD outbreak, stating that outbreaks have been reported in all Provinces. The most recent outbreaks in provinces that had not reported confirmed cases before were recorded in a feedlot in the Northern Cape and an outbreak in the Western Cape (Malmesbury). In all provinces with existing cases, the number of outbreaks is increasing. Apart from confirmed cases, many more likely outbreaks have been identified based on clinical signs, but the NDA is still waiting for laboratory confirmation.

1.2. The Department further clarified that due to the rate of spread, the actual number of confirmed outbreaks is more than outbreaks reported to the World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH) due to the process of reporting. The Department highlighted the arrival of imported vaccines in February 2026, stating that the vaccines would be split up between provinces based on the current level of risk determined on a Municipal level and that the risk classification determined by the Task Team happens in consultation with Provinces. Epidemiologists had developed a risk-based model that results in the mapping of outbreaks and cases, referred to as a “Heatmap”. Cases are

classified as Primary, Secondary and Tertiary. The majority of Primary outbreaks were in KZN, Mpumalanga and the Northern Free State, with isolated pockets in the Eastern Cape also highlighted.

1.3. In order to plan for the number of vaccine doses that would be required, the Department relies on FAO census data from 2019, Bureau for Food and Agricultural Policy (BFAP) numbers, and provincial numbers. Figures used would be verified as orders / distribution takes place and categorization and census details will be adjusted as additional information becomes available.

2. Explaining the Department's response plan in greater detail, the following was highlighted regarding outbreak classification and response actions:

2.1. Tier 1: Emergency Vaccination Zones (Highest Priority)

2.1.1. This zone contains all areas within 10 km radius of any officially declared FMD outbreak, with the objectives of treatment being to halt local spread, protect susceptible herds and to reduce viral shedding in infected clusters. A 10 km radius around each outbreak will be vaccinated, adjusted for natural barriers (rivers, mountains) and farm density. Cattle will be vaccinated first, followed by buffalo only under controlled wildlife–livestock interface plans. Trivalent SAT1, SAT2, SAT3 (based on circulating serotypes) vaccines will be used selecting high-potency emergency vaccine where available. Vaccination must begin within 48–72 hours of outbreak confirmation, with a booster at 21–28 days, for water based, or 6 monthly for oil vaccines.

2.2. Tier 2: Primary Risk area, Epicentres and Endemic FMD Zones (Second Priority)

2.2.1. This zone contains areas with repeated outbreaks, persistent SAT serotype circulation, or proximity to infected wildlife (e.g., Kruger National Park interface, Limpopo, parts of KZN and Mpumalanga) and includes municipalities in KZN, Gauteng, Northwest, and some in Free State Provinces characterized by high animal density and high-risk areas, including Feedlots and dairy farms. The approach to this zone aims to reduce baseline susceptibility, to stabilize endemic transmission cycles and to protect communal cattle populations with high contact rates. Mass vaccination campaigns must be undertaken every 6 months, targeting cattle at a rate of 100% of cattle population. Vaccination will be integrated with surveillance including pre- and post-vaccination sero-monitoring and NSP testing to differentiate infection from vaccination.

2.3. Tier 3: Secondary risk Zones, Buffer Zones and medium-Risk Interface Areas

2.3.1. This zone is defined as areas adjacent to endemic zones or wildlife interfaces but without active outbreaks. The objective of vaccination is to prevent spillover from endemic zones and to strengthen zoning integrity for trade. Strategic vaccination of high-risk herds (communal cattle, dairy, feedlots) will be integrated with annual vaccination (with boosters depending on risk). Enhanced surveillance activity includes monthly clinical inspections and serological sampling every 6 months.

2.3.2. The vaccination plan would require around 12.5 million doses. At present, the Department is expecting 2,5 million doses by end of February 2026, composed of 1 million Biogenesis Bago doses and 1,5 million Dollvet doses. Of the received vaccines, 10% will be allocated for Emergencies in the Western Cape, Northern Cape, and Limpopo, and the remaining 90% allocated to Primary priority (Tier 1) vaccination programmes.

3. Deliberations

- 3.1. A background summary of the main input received during the engagement follows with delegates providing detailed input about the current status of Foot-and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreaks in their provinces, the provincial response to the outbreaks, challenges experienced and the expectation of increased response capacity once vaccines are available to provincial departments.
- 3.2. During the initial stages of the workshop, provinces presented their response to FMD outbreaks and implemented control responses. What was apparent from the presentation was that there did not appear to be a single response plan that is being implemented. This situation was questioned as it was expected that a national response plan would have been implemented in provinces thus resembling a pattern of implementation fitting the Department's 3-tier classification. This was not the case, raising questions about what the exact status of the national-level plan is and whether it is being implemented as presented.
- 3.3. The workshop appeared to be divided into two positions – on one hand the DoA presented its FMD response plan and explained its position around contentious issues such as blocking the private sector from acquiring its own vaccines (As per legislation vaccines import are regulated by the State.) On the other side of the discussion was inputs from various industry representation questioning the Department on numerous matters, such as government's apparent inability to control FMD outbreaks, the lack of emergency stocks of vaccine at the onset of the most recent outbreak, the apparent lack of an urgent response in terms of declaring a national disaster - the Minister requested for a National State of Disaster on 14th Jan 2026 already but was only declared by the President on the 12 Feb 2026 - , the poor control of the movement of cattle across national and provincial boundaries, (it must be kept in mind that for the control of animal movement across national or provincial boundaries, the assistance of the Police or Border Management will be required. The Department of Agriculture does not have

movement control capacity), and a potential lack of capacity to ensure a rapid and sustained vaccination programme if relying solely on government resources

4. Main categories of concern emanating from the workshop

4.1. Law enforcement and border management support:

- 4.1.1. Many provinces, but especially those on the northern border of South Africa, raised concerns about the lack of capacity and visibility of law enforcement and border management capacity as would be needed to control the movement of animals between provinces and between South Africa and neighbouring countries. One of the critical aspects of the National Department's plan is restricting the expansion of outbreaks of FMD and then clearing provinces of the disease involves breaking the country up in different management zones. In each zone, the restriction of animal movement within and between zones will play a crucial role in the speed at which cases are reduced before the zone can be declared FMD free. Various speakers stated that there is very little visible policing of animal transport at present, and little to no control of animal movement across country borders. It was emphasized that there will have to be significant improvement in the control of animal movement for the government's FMD eradication plan to succeed. Speakers also questioned whether all provinces had sufficient law enforcement capacity.

4.2. Department of Agriculture capacity:

- 4.2.1. A prominent theme that emerged during the discussion was the capacity of the Department to disseminate, administer and record vaccine administration in all provinces. Speakers were concerned that there were not sufficient State veterinarians to administer vaccine doses in all provinces and at the rate of administration that will be required. It was proposed that government reach out to private sector veterinarians to assist in the process of vaccine roll-out. Under the Animal Disease Act private veterinarians can register to administer vaccines as part of the national rollout. A second concern that was raised was the ability for the different provinces to maintain cold-rooms in all districts. The vaccines being used

need to be kept in cold-room conditions until use and will not be effective if this is not done. Delegates and speakers from the private sector questioned the capacity of the Department to perform all of these tasks effectively, as well as keeping track of which animals have been vaccinated and therefore would require a booster vaccine some months from now. The Department had presented the workshop with details on the traceability of the Dollvet vaccine being imported from Turkey. From receiving the vaccines at Onderstepoort Biological Products' (OBP) warehouse at Onderstepoort, the individual vials are already barcoded and captured on the national database. When sent to provinces, the destination of each vial is known and when administered, each vial will be scanned. This ensures that the vaccines can be traced from landing at the main warehouse to where it was administered.

4.2.2. The Department could not provide sufficient details at the workshop regarding the distribution of cold-storage facilities, number of veterinarians deployed and number of law enforcement officials that would be supporting the implementation of the FMD eradication plan of government. This matter may require further discussions to clarify.

4.2.3. Various speakers proposed the generation of a central database of competent authorities (including private sector support) that could boost the capacity of the Department in terms of vaccine distribution, storage, dose applications, the application of digital tags to infected and vaccinated animals and the control of animal movement. It was emphasized that vaccination without proper containment of animal movement through roadblocks and isolation of infected animals will cancel out vaccination efforts. It was concerning that these activities were not incorporated into the National Plan at all. Speakers also wanted more details regarding the possibility of compensating communal farmers for their support of FMD response efforts in order to improve their level of support for restrictions and vaccination drives. Section 41 of the Constitution and the Animal Diseases Act place a clear duty on provincial and local authorities to prevent the spread of disease, enforce quarantines, report outbreaks, and uphold strict biosecurity protocols.

4.3. Control of animal movement:

- 4.3.1. A cross-cutting comment that relates to several of the categories listed in this report focuses on a perceived lack in the control of animal movement, especially because of livestock auctions. The speakers who addressed these spoke about conditions observed at all levels of livestock trade. The main concern is the lack of control over the movement of livestock (required permits and documentation for each animal traded and transport permits based on the FMD status of these animals) and a lack of on-the-spot testing of animals at auction. The general perception created by different speakers was that it is unlikely that the department and law enforcement are capacitated to manage the control of movement of cattle in any FMD management zone created. It was proposed that the private sector should also be included in efforts to improve the status quo. It was also the opinion of some industry representatives that government is still not doing enough to curtail the movement of cattle, even though the outbreak has been spreading for a significant period. Outbreaks away from provincial borders, such as the Malmesbury outbreak and cases west of the Nelson Mandela Metro, seem to fit a pattern of road transport of infected animals rather than a gradual expansion of FMD cases from its source.

4.4. Containment of livestock:

- 4.4.1. A number of challenges were raised under this category. First, it was highlighted that farmers that use communal land for grazing and general animal management purposes do not have the ability to isolate vaccinated animals from unvaccinated ones. They do not have the ability to remove infected animals or those suspected of being infected, from the rest of the herd. It is also not possible for these farmers to prevent contact between cattle and other animal species known to spread the disease. This situation will be challenging for government, as it will impact the speed and efficacy of the FMD containment response. It is likely that the main vaccination challenges that will be experienced will not be as a result of the formal commercial beef and dairy farm sectors, but in effectively rolling out the FMD

response in communal farming areas and among smallholder farmers in peri-urban environments. The containment and management of livestock in these farming areas are also closely linked with other challenges such as control of movement of animals (within provinces, between provinces and between South Africa and its neighbours), Farmers' attitudes towards FMD vaccines and the FMD eradication programme and the presence of game species able to spread FMD.

4.5. Farmer attitude towards the FMD programme:

- 4.5.1. A number of private sector speakers highlighted the challenges that will develop when government attempts to roll out any vaccination programmes. All farmers are aware of the fact that vaccinated animals receive lower prices at auction as a result of past branding required when animals had FMD diagnosed. As a result, many (not only small-scale) farmers may resist the roll-out of a vaccination programme that require the reporting of suspected outbreaks and require vaccinated animals to be regulated.

- 4.5.2. A number of speakers proposed that government needed to sharply improve public education processes targeting all segments of non-commercial farmers (this would be subsistence and smallholder farmers in the main but can also include small commercial farmers) that are not part of farmer associations where information about the FMD outbreak and government control and eradication efforts can be shared. These efforts should address:
 - Resistance to reporting FMD cases
 - Resistance to marking of affected cattle (either traditional F-branding or electronic tagging)
 - Prevention of the illegal movement of cattle
 - Improved reporting of broken fences and illegal cross-border movement of cattle.

4.6. Challenges with isolating cattle in South Africa:

4.6.1. Recent publications have indicated that FMD cases have been recorded or suspected in pigs, while it is also known that sheep are able to transmit FMD. As mentioned earlier in the report, game species (ungulates such as buffalo, impala, etc.) are also capable of spreading FMD and thus any attempt to eradicate FMD in cattle will be complicated by the fact that cattle are potentially exposed to additional sources of contamination. Isolating cattle in many parts of the country will be challenging through impossible. Delegates and members from the private sector also expressed their concerns about the breakdown in efficacy of the FMD exclusion zone that used to exist between cattle farms and the Kruger National Park, the expansion of large game farms in cattle-farming areas and easy movement of cattle into and out of South Africa across national borders. It was a common concern that there has been a general breakdown of separation between domestic and wild species in large parts of the country, and that this will influence the effectiveness of current government attempts to contain the FMD outbreak while focusing only on the cattle herds of any region.

4.7. Regulating the entire value chain that is involved in the meat sector:

4.7.1. The theme that emanated from the discussion was that there is a focus on commercial cattle farms and large feed-lots/auctioneers for FMD control implementation, but that there is a significant amount of animal movement that takes place through the actions of smaller livestock agents/brokers/speculators. There was a general perception that there is little to no evidence at present that there is any form of movement regulation or animal health testing associated with these smaller industry players. Control should take the form of law-enforcement initiated roadblocks or departmental regulation (inspections or rigorous implementation of documentation required for the purchase and transport of livestock). As a result, there were reports made that a significant number of smaller agents were routinely unable to prove the source of animals that they had purchased or were in the process

of transporting. Without significantly improving the degree to which government is regulating the activity of these smaller role-players, control of FMD outbreaks will not be achieved.

4.8. Type of FMD strain and efficacy of vaccines:

4.8.1. Concern was expressed by industry regarding the Department's current level of understanding of the type of strains of FMD that are in circulation in the different provinces, what the sources of these hotspot outbreaks were and which type of vaccines were the most effective for controlling and eradicating specific strains of FMD. Clarity was also sought from the Department about the efficacy of vaccinating cattle only in comparison to all the other possible sources/carriers of FMD. Stakeholders wanted to know whether the Department is in the position to analyze samples of FMD cases across the country in real time and redirect efforts where inefficient vaccines are being used. The Department informed the workshop that for the most part, South African cases of FMD is outbreaks of the SAT-1, SAT-2 and SAN-3 strains (SAT-1 and SAT-2 dominating current outbreaks), and that the vaccines that had been imported are effective in treating cattle for FMD. The Department expanded that much of the concern about "efficacy" centered on the number of months between vaccination and follow-up treatment. Water-based vaccines are effective for 4 months and are typically used where animals are set to be slaughtered for the meat industry shortly. Oil-based vaccines are effective for 6 months and are used in breeding/dairy settings where the animal is not destined for consumption in the short term. At present, Dollvet vaccine and Botswana Veterinary Institute vaccine are being imported. Dollvet is an oil-based vaccine, while the BVI vaccine is water-based. In the days before the workshop, a batch of Biogénesis Bagó vaccine from Argentina also arrived in the country.

4.8.2. Delegates were concerned about the country's capacity to respond to the technical roles during the FMD outbreak response. It was questioned why South Africa was sending FMD samples to Pirbright laboratory in the United Kingdom for analysis, and why South Africa is relying on imported vaccines. The Department clarified that the Agricultural Research Council (ARC) and not OBP is responsible for the

manufacture of FMD vaccines in South Africa. At present, the facility operated by ARC is only able to produce 20 000 vaccines per week, but that the facility is being upgraded to deal with the greater demand for locally produced vaccines. The Department did clarify that the ARC can perform sample analysis. There is still a need to clarify whether real-time analysis of positive tests is used to fine-tune vaccine response as it is apparent that most outbreaks are driven by a few strains that are effectively treated with the vaccines currently available. At the time of the presentation, it was noted that 12.5 million doses were required with only 2,5 million doses being procured by the end of February without any mention about the procurement of the 10 million dosage shortfall. Further clarity was sought as to why the ARC (a research facility) and not the OBP was tasked with the production of vaccines.

5. Role of the NCOP:

5.1. During the interaction with representatives, it was noted that a meeting of this kind – between the NCOP and all the provincial departments responsible for agriculture – was noteworthy and should be built upon rather than be seen as a once-off event. Delegates suggested that there must be an institutionalization of structured reporting of provincial vaccination programmes to ensure that there is alignment with national targets. It was further recommended that a province-by-province vaccination dashboard is generated and kept up to date to allow for transparency and information sharing that would strengthen a coordinated oversight effort.

5.2. Delegates called for proposals on how the NCOP can monitor whether provincial veterinary capacity is sufficient for the planned roll-out of the vaccination programme, monitoring the adequacy of surveillance and laboratory capacity and human capital performance to ensure that the FMD strategy succeeds. It was felt that the control of the movement of animals at provincial level needed to be improved to ensure that it does not compromise the National FMD Strategy. Finally, it was proposed that the outbreak readiness of provincial veterinary services, which is a schedule 4 competency, should form part of NCOP oversight, coupled with the development and

implementation of a standardized framework for private veterinarian authorization for the integration of additional veterinarian support to the government's FMD control efforts.

- 5.3. Delegates felt that in terms of provincial efforts in the implementation of this FMD programme, it is also the responsibility of the NCOP to conduct structured oversight over the efforts of all provinces to ensure alignment with National Policy and strategy.

6. Committee Recommendations

- 6.1. The delegation strongly advises the rapid development of an institutionalised, structured reporting process on provincial vaccination rollout, disease incidence and disease prevention measures to ensure alignment with national targets.
- 6.2. To assist farmers and local government alike, it is proposed that the NCOP investigate the possibility of developing a province-by-province vaccination progress dashboard to strengthen coordinated oversight between spheres of government. Data recorded should include provincial surveillance data and laboratory performance to ensure that provincial reporting continues to inform national biosecurity risk classification updates and to strengthen early warning systems to government and farmers alike.
- 6.3. As part of provincial engagements during the roll-out of the FMD vaccination drive, the delegation strongly advises local- and provincial government level reporting on the deployment of provincial veterinary capacity in order for the NCOP to monitor that the effort will be sufficient to administer the number of vaccines planned within required timeframes.
- 6.4. The Delegation proposes engagement with the relevant committee within the NCOP responsible for law enforcement to ensure that the control of animal movement and other animal control enforcement required at provincial level supports the national biosecurity framework.

- 6.5. For the committee to track biosecurity responsibilities related to Schedule 4 responsibilities in each province, the delegation recommends measurable provincial preparedness benchmarks to give practical effect to Schedule 4 biosecurity responsibilities.
- 6.6. The NCOP should encourage provinces to formally integrate authorised private veterinarians into provincial outbreak plans to enhance capacity without weakening oversight? (Keeping in mind any national legislation)
- 6.7. The delegation noted with concern the figures related to the number of State veterinarians available and the number of vaccines per day that must be administered to bring the FMD outbreak under control. It is recommended that provincial departments seriously consider developing a standardised framework for private veterinarian authorisation to ensure uniformity across provinces and speed up assistance from the private sector in administering FMD vaccines in areas where their assistance is critical to the success of the programme.
- 6.8. The delegation proposes a six-month follow-up review of provincial veterinary capacity to be conducted to measure progress against commitments made in this workshop, and that the monitoring of veterinary capacity and performance of control measures across all provinces become standardised monthly to avert degradation of intervention capacity.

Report to be considered.